During writing this paper we were not aware of some strongly related papers [4, 5, 24] . We plan to provide a revised version of this paper shortly Some recent papers demonstrate how to reveal aggregated sensitive data by combining addition of noise with special cryptographic encoding. These results guarantee security in terms of differential privacy. Such approach is problematic since in some scenarios getting a noisy result is unacceptable, even if the calibration of the noise is optimal. Moreover, adding noise generated from a complex distribution can be problematic for practical reasons -in particular when the data is collected in a system of constrained devices.
INTRODUCTION
Let us imagine a following problem. There is a set of users and each of them keeps a single value. We have to reveal some aggregated data (say, the sum of all single values) and preserve the privacy of individuals (say, modelled using standard differential privacy notion). In recent years there have been some very promising ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-2138-9. DOI: 10.1145/1235 results, based on combining cryptographic techniques with adding noise to the original data (before aggregation) in order to perturb them. To the best of our knowledge this approach was introduced for the first time in [35] and [31] . To present this approach in a nutshell we may say that the cryptographic encoding is used for ensuring that no information but the aggregated sum of all individual users is released (in particular no single value held by any given user can be learned by the observer) while adding the noise hides the real values and guarantees the differential privacy. Synergy of these methods allows adding relatively small noise -since having aggregated data the single added noise in some sense "covers" all real values. This approach however is not always satisfactory. In some cases we need to have exact aggregated data. Moreover, as pointed in some recent papers, adding noise may lead to significant errors of aggregated data. Therefore, even if having rough estimation is acceptable for a given scenario, the resulting statistics may be too far from the exact values ( [20, 30] ) to be usable in practice. Finally, adding noise, specifically from a non-standard distribution, can be technically problematic -especially when the aggregated data may come from small, computationally constrained devices. In fact, to the best of our knowledge there is no evidence that the noisy values can be useful in the widely considered area of applications. We believe that the problem of the utility of the noisy values is somehow underestimated.
One may ask if it is possible to circumvent the problem of adding noise while preserving the differential privacy of users. Unfortunately, in the given paradigm, adding noise is inevitable if we require differential privacy. Moreover, if we assume that users operate independently and do not determine randomized values used to perturb the original data, the level of aggregated noise has to be Ω( √ n), where n is the number of users (as proved in [7] ). On the other hand, if we observe some real-life classic applications of aggregation we have an intuition that one can safely release aggregated data without adding noise and such act does not expose any individuals' privacy. The first example is the average national income. This is clear that it says in practice nothing significant about the incomes of any of our neighbors. Even revealing the average income of employees in a big company is going to be completely secure in terms of privacy of individuals. In contrast, revealing the exact average (sum) income in a small community exposes users to obvious risk. In our paper we discuss this phenomenon. We state that the privacy of aggregated data may be efficiently secured without additional noise as long as the data has enough randomness on its own and is independent from the observer's (attacker) point of view. In our paper we formally define security for the case when the adversary has no complete knowledge of the data. We show that this definition agrees with classic (computational) differential privacy -formally speaking it is an extension. Let us stress that we definitely do not want to suggest yet another, substantially different definition of privacy. Our approach can just be seen as utilizing "uncertainty" that naturally appears in some data sources to hide the contributions of individuals in the aggregated outcome. Additionally, in the end we depict possibly wide classes of data that can be handled without adding noise.
Our results and organization of this paper
In a nutshell the results of our paper can be summarized in a one sentence: For a quite wide range of types of data adding noise is not necessary for guaranteeing privacy of individuals.
In Section 2 we explain our motivations and provide some formalism that can be seen as an extension of differential privacy notion. Section 3 is devoted to analysis of chosen classes of data. In Subsection 3.1 we focus on the case when from the adversary's perspective the aggregated data is a set of independent random values. Most important is the case discussed in Section 3.2, wherein we allow the adversary to know a priori some dependencies between data.
In our paper we consider security guarantees for realistic size of data, since purely asymptotic approach seems to be inadequate for typical areas of application. That is, let us stress that we present formulas that can be used for deciding if revealing aggregated data from a given types of data is secure even for a moderate number of users. We try to illustrate some of our results with chosen examples and numerical results in order to demonstrate that they are adequate for real-life settings. At the end in Section 4 we recall some previous and related work. We conclude and outline the future work in Section 5. Since our paper is quite technical for the sake of clarity of presentation, some of proofs and discussions about the extended definition of privacy have been moved to the Appendix.
MODEL
In the system there are n users that may represent different types of parties (organization, individuals or even sensing devices). There is also a single party -the aggregator. Each i-th user has a value xi. The aggregator should learn the statistic M (x1, . . . , xn) but nothing else. In the case of M (x1, . . . , xn) = Σxi this is possible using homomorphic encryption exactly as in [35] and in dozens of papers following this seminal work.
Exactly as in [35] and a long line of following papers we assume that the aggregator is untrusted and aims at learning some additional knowledge about the users' data, possibly using some external information. The difference is in two points.
1. In contrast to [35] , the users do not add noise to their value (thus the released statistic M is exact).
2. In the analysis we assume that at least some of xi's are seen by the aggregator as randomized.
One may be tempted to think that treating users' values as random values is the same as randomizing them by adding noise. These cases however are substantially different as we have different distributions. Moreover, in the second case we need to take into account dependencies that naturally appear in real-life settings. Unfortunately, the analysis is more complicated at least for discussed classes of data and requires formal treatment that to the best of our knowledge cannot be reduced to previous results.
Applications The described framework can be used for a wide range of applications including networks of sensing environmental parameters, smart metering (e.g, electricity), clinical research, population monitoring or cloud services. Due to space limitation we do not go into detail. Most important is however that in all these areas there are natural cases, when we cannot fully trust the aggregator. This is typical in distributed systems with devices belonging to different operators. More details can be found in [35] .
Modeling privacy of randomized data.
We want to introduce a privacy model in which the data (or at least part of it) is considered random, coming from a specific distribution. This kind of approach if quite natural in many scenariosthat is the knowledge of the adversary is usually limited. This "uncertainty" can be utilized. However, it needs a different definition of privacy than standard differential privacy as in [16] , because we have to take into account randomized inputs. We call this approach Self Differential Privacy. Before we show its formal definition, we need to introduce a following DEFINITION 1 (ADJACENT RANDOM VECTORS). Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn) be an arbitrary random vector and let X be other random vector. We will say that vectors X and X are adjacent if and only if X = (X1, . . . , Xi, Xn+1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn),
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
This essentially captures the notion of data vectors adjacency similar to the one in [16] , but for random variables rather than deterministic values. See also that if for some deterministic vector x we have X = x with probability 1, then this definition of adjacency is the same as in [16] . Now we can formally define Self Differential Privacy in the following way DEFINITION 2 (SELF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY). We call a privacy mechanism M and a random vector X = (X1, . . . , Xn) self differentially private with parameters ( , δ) if for any random vector X such that X and X are adjacent we have
Intuitively, this definition says that if data can be considered random, then the outcome of the coin flip of any single user does not significantly change the result of deterministic mechanism M , whether the user is added to the result, or removed from it. This is very similar to standard differential privacy. A more detailed comparison is moved to the Appendix. Throughout this paper we will use abbreviation ( , δ)-SDP to denote self differential privacy with parameters and δ.
Note that we do not claim that this new model of privacy should be used instead of standard differential privacy. We rather see it as a generalization of the known differential privacy definition that can be useful for some real life scenarios. See that in Rem.3 (Appendix) we showed that our model is indeed more general than differential privacy, but if we fix the data as deterministic, it is essentially the same definition.
Whether or not particular data can be considered random is of course an important problem to be solved by the data holder, and is beyond the scope of this paper.
See that in our definition of privacy, random data has natural self-hiding properties, even for mechanisms which are deterministic. Instead of relying on the randomness of mechanism (as in the standard differential privacy), we can sometimes rely on the inherent randomness of the data itself. We are especially interested in deterministic mechanisms in that model, as they have an obvious benefit of not introducing any errors, so the answer to a query is exact.
The most common and useful deterministic mechanism would be simply summing all data without adding any noise. In section 3 we show that mechanism M (X) = sum(X) already has quite strong self differential privacy properties for various distributions of X. Translating into real terms this means that the exact sum can be revealed without the risk of privacy violation.
RESULTS FOR SDP
First, let us recall some definitions and properties. We use binomial distribution with parameters n and p, which we denote as Bin(n, p). It is well known that if random variables X, Y are independent and have distributions Bin(n1, p) and Bin(n2, p), respectively then X + Y has distribution Bin(n1 + n2, p)
We denote the cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution as Φ(x). Also, we refer to lattice distributions with step 1, which is a generic name for discrete distributions such that support of this distribution can be represented in the form {a + k : a = 0 ∧ k ∈ Z}. The abbreviation i.i.d stands for independent, identically distributed.
Independent data
Let us consider a simple scenario, where Xi are i.i.d. random variables and Xi ∼ Bin(1, p). We want to aggregate the sum of all these variables so we set M (X) = n i=1 Xi ∼ Bin(n, p). Let us prove the following lemma:
Proof of this lemma is quite simple, yet it requires some careful calculations, and is moved to the Appendix for completeness.
Now we can state a theorem which shows that i.i.d. binomial data has very strong self differential privacy properties for a wide range of parameters. First we consider the case where δ is fixed and obtain so that the data with summing mechanism is ( , δ)-SDP. Then we fix and calculate δ. Both cases are considered in the following THEOREM 1. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn) be a data vector , where Xi ∼ Bin(1, p) are i.i.d. random variables. If we use mechanism M (X) = n i=1 (Xi) and fix δ P (M (X) = 0) + P (M (X) = n), we obtain that it is ( , δ)-SDP for the following
On the other hand, if > 0 is fixed, we get
PROOF. Let us begin with the first case, where δ is fixed. One obvious observation is that M (X) ∼ Bin(n, p). Using Chernoff bounds (see for example [10] ) for binomial distribution we get
We want to limit the tail probability by parameter δ, so we want to find a λ such that the right side of this inequality is equal to δ. This yields
Let us denote the set S = { µ−λ , . . . , µ+λ }, which is exactly the support of M (X) without the tails which probability we just limited by δ. Now we have to find such that, apart from the tails, the following condition is satisfied
It is easy to see that instead of checking all subsets of S, we can check only the single values, because taking a single value with a bigger ratio yields worst case bound. For that, we can use Lemma 1.
This means that at least 0 and n are in the tail that we already limited by δ. Therefore, (np − λ) > 0 and (np + λ) < n. Applying Lemma 1 for X and λ we obtain that
for u ∈ S and |u − v| 1. Observe that
so from Lemma 1 we have
. Now see that in our case, for Xi ∼ Bin(1, p) i.i.d. we have data sensitivity 1. One can easily see that adding or removing a single data point can change the sum only by 1. Therefore we have
where X and X are adjacent vectors and = (n, p, δ). The addition of δ comes from the fact that we bound the tails of M (X).
Now we assume that we have a fixed > 0. Let α = e and w = . We are interested in the greatest integer k smaller than np, which does not satisfy the following
We have
. We will bound the tail using Chernoff bound
Now we can pick δ1 in the following way
we can do similar symmetric reasoning as before, we obtain
Now we pick δ(n, p, ) which is max(δ1, δ2), so we have
This concludes the proof, because we found a bound for the subset of possible values which did not satisfy our required ratio. In the end we have , can be large, although as long as p is constant, still approaches 0 with n → ∞.
Similarly, for p very close to 0 or 1 and for small n, the value of δ can be large. Nevertheless we see that δ is decreasing exponentially to 0 with n → ∞, so for sufficiently large n we still get very small values of δ, even if p was strongly biased.
To ilustrate it, consider the following example
. We use mechanism M (X) = n i=1 (Xi). Let us first fix δ = 0.01. Using Theorem 1 we obtain that it is ( , δ)-SDP. Figure 1 shows how decreases with n. On the other hand, if we fix = 0.3 we see in Figure 2 the values of δ, depending on n.
One can observe that these privacy parameters are very good, despite small number of participants. Moreover, they decrease quickly with growing n.
To conclude, we can say that aggregated independent 0 − 1 random variables do not need any processing (including adding noise) to protect the knowledge about a single user. Let us note that this holds even if the parameter p is unknown (but is upper and lowerbounded ) and for example the aggregator aims at estimating it.
So much for the simplest case. Let us move to the intermediate model where the data is seen as coming from different but still Second fact is a well known theorem in probability theory, one can find it for example in [18] . 
, where C 0.5591.
The upper bound for constant C comes from [36] . Let us prove following lemma.
Xi, where Xi are independent random variables having lattice distribution with step 1. Let
and assume EXi = 0 and E|Xi| 3 < ∞ for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For u, v such that |u − v| ∆ we have
The main idea for this lemma is to use Berry-Esseen theorem to deal with normal random variables instead of binomials. Then we use normal distribution properties to obtain appropriate and δ. The proof of this lemma is moved to the Appendix.
Before stating and proving our next theorem, we will introduce a following DEFINITION 3 (DATA SENSITIVITY). We will say that data vector X = (X1, . . . , Xn) and mechanism M have data sensitivity ∆ if an only if
for every vector X that is adjacent to X.
Note that this bears close resemblance to the l1-sensitivity defined in [16] . Let us suppose now that we have Xi ∼ Bin(k, pi) and we want to aggregate M (X) = n i=1 Xi. The following theorem shows what are the privacy parameters in that case. THEOREM 2. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn) be a data vector, where Xi ∼ Bin(k, pi) are independent random variables. Assume that PROOF. Let X be any vector adjacent to X. First we observe that adding or removing data of one user can change the sum by at most k, so the data sensitivity is k. In other words, we have 
Lastly, Yi's have lattice distribution with step 1 and are also independent. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 2 for ∆ = k to obtain
for |u − v| k. The inequality comes from Lemma 2 and the parameter is as follows
as we stated before, data sensitivity is k, so ∆ = k in formula from Lemma 2. Furthermore, parameter δ is also obtained
Formula for δ is a bit complicated, but we can greatly simplify it. First simple observation is that we have
Next, we assumed that σ
It is easy to check that it gives 1. Then also e 3. Combining these observations we have
In the end we have
which is what we wanted to prove. REMARK 1. One may easily observe, that if we assume that the data consists of n random variables and m deterministic values (i.e. known for adversary), then Theorem 2 still holds. REMARK 2. Theorem 2 can be extended for other than binomial distributions of {Xi}. One only has to check if the sequence of random variables satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 2. The constants might slightly change (depending on the distribution), as in the proof of this theorem we used some properties of Bin(k, pi) to get more elegant bound, but asymptotically the result stays the same.
Applications and Significance
Theorems 1,2 and remarks concerning these theorems give us very general notion of privacy parameters for summing independent data. We also present an example. EXAMPLE 2. Consider a data vector X = (X1, . . . , Xn), where Xi ∼ Bin(k, pi) are independent random variables. Let k = 50.
We use mechanism M (X) = n i=1 (Xi). Using Theorem 2 we obtain that it is ( , δ)-SDP. Figure 3 shows how the decreases with n, while Figure 4 shows how δ decreases with n. We can see that for n around 4000 parameter δ is smaller than 0.05, which is a constant widely used in differential privacy literature, and decreases further. Also, note that for n 4000 the parameter is below 0.5 which also is a widely used constant in differential privacy papers (see for example [8] ). The parameters become even better with more users. 
Locally dependent data
In the previous subsection we gave a general treatment for privacy parameters for independent variables. However, in many cases the data has some local dependencies involved. Such dependencies are modelled using dependency neighborhoods notion, which is defined as below DEFINITION 4. A collection of random variables X1, . . . , Xn has dependency neighborhoods Ni ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} if i ∈ Ni and Xi is independent of {Xj} j / ∈N i . One can visualize the data as graph, which has edges denoting dependency between data points and the ith node has degree |Ni|. We want to give a general approach to local dependencies scenario, so we do not assume anything about joint distributions of the dependent subsets. For the clarity of proof we will assume that Xi ∼ Bin(1, pi), however the theorem can be extended for a very large class of distributions in a straightforward manner. As previously, we want to take the sum of all our data and show privacy parameters for this mechanism.
We are going to take a similar approach as in Theorem 2. That is, we want to bound the distance between the sum of our data and normal distribution. Then, using standard differential privacy properties of normal distribution (described in Fact 1) we derive privacy parameters. However, this time we cannot use Berry-Esseen theorem to bound the mentioned distance, as the data is not independent. We use Stein's method (see for example [3, 33] ), which allows to bound the Kolmogorov distance between two random variables. Apart from that, the presented reasoning is very similar to Theorem 2. Firstly, we introduce some notation and facts. DEFINITION 5. Let X and Y be a random variables. Let µ and ν be their corresponding probability measures. We denote their Kolmogorov distance as dK (X, Y ) which is defined as
where FX (·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of X. Furthermore, we denote Wasserstein distance as dW (X, Y ) which is defined as
where H = {h : R → R : |h(x) − h(y)| |x − y|}.
These are standard probability metrics, their definition is also given in, for example, [33] . We also recall a useful relation between Kolmogorov and Wasserstein distance.
FACT 3 (FROM [33] ). Suppose that a random variable Y has its density bound by some constant C. Then for any random variable X we have
Moreover, if Y ∼ N (0, 1), then for any random variable X we have
Lastly, we recall a theorem from [33] .
FACT 4 (THEOREM 3.6 IN [33] ). Let X1, . . . , Xn be random variables such that EX
. Let the collection (X1, . . . , Xn) have dependency neighborhoods Ni, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and also define D = max 1 i n |Ni|. Then, for random variable Z with standard normal distribution we have
This fact is obtained by using Stein's method. We will use these facts to prove our next lemma, which is stated in a following way
Xi. Assume that Xi has lattice distribution with step 1 and also EXi = 0 and EX 
Proof of this lemma is presented in the Appendix. Note that both in this lemma and in the next theorem we denote σ 2 = V ar(
as in previous subsection. Having introduced necessary definitions, facts and after stating Lemma 3, we are ready to prove the following THEOREM 3. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn) be a data vector, where Xi ∼ Bin(k, pi), having dependency neighborhoods Ni, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Denote the size of largest dependency neighborhood as D = max 1 i n |Ni|. Assume that σ 2 = V ar(
where C = 5 2 π 1 4 and Yi = (Xi − kpi).
PROOF. Let X be any vector adjacent to X. First we observe that adding or removing data of one user can change the sum by at most kD, so the data sensitivity is kD. In other words, we have
Now we want to use Lemma 3. Consider a random vector Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn), where Yi = (Xi − kpi). Let us also denote p = n i=1 p i n . One can easily see that EYi = 0 and after simple calculations EY
Moreover, Yi's have lattice distribution with step 1. Obviously, dependency neighborhoods stay the same and also variances. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 3 for ∆ = kD to obtain
where |u − v| kD. The inequality comes from Lemma 3 and the parameters and δ are as follows . Now observe that we assumed σ 2 9k 2 D 2 ln(n). That yields 1 3 . Therefore we also have e 3 2 . We can slightly simplify δ so that it is independent of
Combining it together we have
which completes the proof of this theorem.
The result in Theorem 3 is very general, we assumed little about the dependency. Moreover, it can also easily be extended (just like Theorem 2) for wide class of other distributions. The extension to other distributions can be made by simply checking the assumptions and applying Lemma 3 (if possible). As one can see, the parameter δ in Lemma 3 is quite complicated, yet with careful treatment it can be simplified, at least for some distributions.
Another approach for dealing with locally dependent data can be used. Provided that we have m independent data points in our data vector, we can state and prove a following THEOREM 4. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xm, Xm+1, . . . , Xn) be a data vector, where for i m we have Xi ∼ Bin(k, pi) and independent. On the other hand, for i > m, Xi are dependent such that each is dependent of at most D other data points. Assume that PROOF. Let X be any vector adjacent to X. First we observe that the data sensitivity is kD. In other words, we have
Now we will use Lemma 2 for the independent part of the data. Consider a random vector Y = (Y1, . . . , Ym), where Yi = (Xi −
Lastly, Yi's have lattice distribution with step 1 and are also independent. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 2 for ∆ = kD to obtain
where |u − v| kD. The inequality comes from Lemma 2 and the parameters and δ are as follows
It is easy to see that it gives 1. Then also e 3. Combining these observations we have
which is what we wanted to prove.
Note that the only thing we assumed in this theorem is the independence of some elements of data, and the data sensitivity.
Relation to results from [35]
Let us stress that all results from this section can be instantly applied to the framework defined by [35] and used in a long list of subsequent papers. In particular we can use an appropriate homomorphic encryption, key distribution scheme launched before aggregation etc. From the algorithmic perspective the only difference is giving up on adding the noise by single users.
From security analysis' perspective we additionally assume that knowledge of the adversary about the aggregated data can be modelled as specified in the aforementioned theorems. If such assumptions are fulfilled then all security guarantees from [35] hold with parameters given in our paper. Moreover our definition can be changed into its computational version in an obvious manner exactly as the computational differential privacy is a counterpart of the regular differential privacy.
Finally, let us note that in [35] the authors assume that a subset of users may be corrupted and cooperate with the aggregator. Moreover they consider a case when a series of data is aggregated over time. Both cases can be combined with our results in a straightforward manner.
PREVIOUS AND RELATED WORK
There are many papers that should be mentioned as related work. Our paper can be seen as a continuation of the line of the research started in the seminal paper [35] wherein authors construct a mechanism that allows the untrusted aggregator to learn only the intended statistics but no additional information. Moreover the statistics revealed to the aggregator satisfy differential privacy. The result is obtained by combining applied cryptography techniques with regular methods used for privacy preserving.
Similar ideas have been suggested in two other notable papers [31] and [32] . In both of them, the authors use a substantially different model of security. Moreover in the latter the users communicate between each other, while in [35] as well as in our paper we assume that there is a communication between aggregator and individual users only.
Note that most of protocols described in related papers fail to provide the correct output even if only a single user abstains from sending his share of the input. The solutions for dynamic networks have been presented in [20] and [8] . Approach based on [35] was also focused on more advanced particular processing of aggregated data (e.g., evaluation and monetization) while keeping privacy of users is discussed in several papers ( [2, 17, 6, 30] ). Another vain of protocols represent [1, 21] wherein authors present some aggregation methods that preserve privacy, however they do not consider dynamic changes inside of the network. The latter also considers data poisoning attacks, however the authors do not provide rigid proofs. In [28, 34] the authors present a framework for some aggregation functions and consider the confidentiality of the result, but leaving nodes' privacy out of scope. Clearly there are many papers discussing aggregation protocols without considering security nor privacy issues (e.g., [22, 26] ). There is a long list of papers devoted to fault tolerant aggregation protocols ( [19, 23, 25] ) for significantly different settings.
As a related work we shall point also a huge body of papers dealing with differential privacy notions and their extension. The idea of differential privacy has been introduced for the first time in [15] , however its precise formulation in the widely used form appeared in [11] . Most important properties have been introduced in papers [13, 14] . There is a long list of papers that can be seen as a direct extension of [15] i.e., [6, 13] . In all that papers a substantially different trust model is used. Namely there is a party called curator that is entitled to see all participants' data in the clear and releases the computed data to wider (possibly untrusted) audience.
Paper [27] presents aggregation of elements of dataset from perspective of preserving differential privacy. The presented framework significantly differs from our approach in a few points. First of all, it uses adding noise to raw data.
An introduction to differential privacy can be found in [12] . An excellent, comprehensive description of recent results can be found in [16] .
Despite large and still growing number of papers about privacy preserving data aggregation, to the best of our knowledge, there was no attempt to utilize the randomized character of collected data in a manner presented in our paper.
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
We pointed that in some cases it seems to be secure to reveal aggregated data without adding noise without exposing users to privacy threat.
Many questions are left unanswered, however two of them seem to be most important both form practitioners' point of view as well as for the theory. We leave them as a future work.
• Most of the literature about data aggregation (including this paper) limits discussion to computing the sum of "aggregated" values (or its simple function i.e, the average). Possibly some other natural functions including maximum, minimum or quantiles could be also revealed without harming privacy of individuals if we use very little or no noise. Except even more elaborated probabilistic analysis we would need however more complex cryptographic methods. Note that using homomorphic encryption is not sufficient. On the other hand applying regular secure multi-party computation (SMPC) may be computationally too demanding for many scenarios (in particular collecting data from networks of constrained devices). In the future work we plan to concentrate on a wider and very natural class of fuctions called aggregative functions described in [29] .
• We hope to find a more general description of data that can be aggregated without adding noise. A promising direction is to use notion of min entropy notion (see e.g., [9] ) of data source assuming limited dependencies between values kept by users.
APPENDIX
A. TECHNICAL PROOFS
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We want to bound
, where |u − v| = 1 and X ∼ Bin(n, p). Furthermore, we know that u ∈ [np − λ, np + λ] ∩ Z. First observe that we get the biggest ratio either for the smallest or greatest possible u. Moreover, if p 1 2 we get the biggest ratio for the smallest possible u. Therefore it remains to check these two cases, calculate 1 and 2 and pick = max( 1, 2).
Let us begin with the case where p . We have X ∼ Bin(n, p). One can easily check that the greatest possible ratio is for u = np − λ and v = (u − 1). We can bound it in the following way
Ultimately we are interested in the natural logarithm of that ratio. We have > 0, because we assumed that (np − λ) > 0. We also have p > λ n so all performed derivations are correct. Note that we picked the biggest possible ratio, so for p 1 2 it is true for every u ∈ [np − λ, np + λ] ∩ Z that P (X = u) P (X = v) e 1 ⇐⇒ P (X = u) e 1 P (X = v),
where |u − v| = 1. Now let us assume that p > 1 2 . In that case the greatest possible ratio is for u = (np + λ) and v = (u + 1). One can easily see, that we can simply consider Bin(n, 1 − p) and apply exactly the same reasoning as before. That leaves us with In the end we found , which has a property that for all u ∈ [np − λ, np + λ] ∩ Z and |u − v| = 1 it holds that P (X = u) e P (X = v), which concludes the proof of this lemma.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
To prove this lemma, we will use Facts 1 and 2 from Section 3.1. We have X = n i=1 Xi and σ 2 = n i=1 V arX i n . Recall that X has a lattice distribution with step 1. Let u be any of possible values of X. We begin with taking
which is correct because of the distribution of X. Observe that EXi = 0 and E|Xi| 3 < ∞, so we can use Fact 2. Let Z ∼ N (0, nσ 2 ).
where δ1
0.56
is the rate of convergence described in Fact 2. Now we can use Fact 1:
e P v − 1 2 Z v + 1 2 + 2δ1 + δ2.
Both and δ2 are parameters from Fact 1, for the normal distribution with variance nσ 2 and |u − v| ∆. In particular, we can fix δ2 = Now we have to return to our initial distribution. Again, we use Fact 2.
e P v − 1 2 Z v + 1 2 + 2δ1 + δ2 e P v − 1 2 X v + 1 2 + 2δ1(1 + e ) + δ2 = = e P (X = v) + 2δ1(1 + e ) + δ2.
During this reasoning we already obtained . We also have δ = 2δ1(1 + e ) + δ2 1.12
(1 + e ) + 4 5 √ n .
Finally we have P (X = u) e P (X = v) + δ1(1 + e ) + δ2 e P (X = v) + δ, which concludes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
To prove this lemma, we use facts stated in Section 3.2, namely Fact 3 and 4. We also use Kolmogorov and Wasserstein distances, which were defined in Section 3.2 in Definition 5. We have X =
